HONG KONG TRADE MARK INFRINGEMENT
"GREENPEACE"
High Court of Hong Kong
Barry Yen, So Keung Yip & Sin, SKYS
Issue - whether use of a mark as a name of a business is trade mark use/whether use of a mark on hang tags, sales memos, credit card receipts, business cards, carry bags and on windows is trade mark use.
Facts - Stichting Greenpeace Council (the Plaintiff) is the proprietor of a registration in Hong Kong for the trade mark GREENPEACE claiming clothing. Income Team and others (the Defendants) operated a number of very successful retail shops under the name GREEN PEACE. The Defendants first used the trade name GREEN PEACE IN 1988 and their retail shops have sold well known branded clothing as well as clothing which bore brands which were not well known in Hong Kong. The Defendants acquired a reputation for selecting clothing which would appeal to the younger market.
The Plaintiff complained that the Defendants had infringed their GREENPEACE trade mark registration by:
- use of the GREEN PEACE mark on hang-tags fixed to the clothing. These hang tags were distinctive and the word GREEN PEACE could be read at some distance. It was noted that the hang tags were removed by the shop assistant at the time of purchase and not retained by the customer;
- use of the GREEN PEACE mark on sales memos and credit card receipts;
- use of the GREEN PEACE mark on shopping bags;
- use of the GREEN PEACE mark on mailing list application forms available at the shop premises;
- use of the GREEN PEACE mark on business cards;
- use of the GREEN PEACE mark as the name of the defendants' shops;
- use of the GREEN PEACE mark on windows on the defendants' shops.
The issue was whether the use of the GREEN PEACE mark in those circumstances was use on goods and therefore whether there was an infringement. There was no issue about the validity of the Plaintiff's registration or that the marks were deceptively similar. Whilst there was also an issue relating to passing off that was not discussed at this hearing.
The Defendants argued that their use did not amount to trade mark use since it did not indicate the origin of the goods. The Defendants' sought to rely on passages from the decision of the Vice Chancellor in Furnitureland Limited v Harris and others [1989] F.S.R. 536 ("Furnitureland") at 542 where he stated that there was "formidable support for the proposition that the mere retail sales of goods, not being gods for which the retailer accepts any responsibility beyond that of a normal retailer, is not use of a mark in the trade mark sense". It was argued by the defendants in the Furnitureland case that the use of a mark in relation to goods postulates a use of the mark as a trade mark, the essential nature of which is a representation of the origin of goods or, at least some operation carried out in relation to the goods. It was argued that any mere retailer of goods under the brand name of the manufacturer is not using the retailer's name as a mark in relation to those goods.
The judge, Rogers J., stated that the purpose of a trade mark was not simply confined to manufacturing origin. It was also said to include the selection of goods and offering them for sale. Rogers J. noted that the Vice Chancellor in the Furnitureland case was only considering an interlocutory application and that he did not come to any concluded view but held that the plaintiff had an arguable case that offering for sale under a name is capable of constituting use of the name in a trade mark sense. Rogers J. went on to state that infringing use was "use which indicates a connection between the goods and the owner of the name".
In arriving at his conclusion Rogers J., relied on:
- prior case law, particularly Aristoc v Rysta (1945) 62 RPC 65 where he favorably quoted Lord Maugham's comment that "a registered trade mark has been understood as being used in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating the origin of the goods, in other words, for the purpose of indicating either manufacture or some other dealings with the goods in the process of manufacture or in the course of business before they are offered for sale to the public". Rogers J. stated that he had no doubt that Lord Maugham, "in referring to origin was deliberately including other things not merely manufacture"; and
- in Dan Shanahan's respected treatise entitles " Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off" where he stated at page 34 that "the retailer does in a sense "select" the goods sold, and indeed the reputation of the retailer may well influence a prospective purchaser's easement of those goods. The retailers' mark thus "vouches his responsibility" for the goods, albert to a limited degree, and it has been recognized that the presence of the manufacturer's mark does not preclude the registration of the retailer's mark in relation to the goods the retailer sells.
Rogers J. also favorable quoted C.D. Wilkinson in his book on Hong Kong trade mark law where the learned author stated that "A trade-mark cannot be assumed to denote that its proprietor is the actual manufacturer of the goods to which the mark is affixed. All that it denotes is that the goods to which such trade mark is affixed are goods in which the proprietor of that trade mark deals, and the goods are probably similar in quality to goods previously purchased from the same proprietor, and with the same trade-mark affixed thereto".
Rogers J. stated that a retailer can use its own mark on goods alongside a manufacturer's mark.